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Baade: The Case of the Disinterested Two States: Neumeier v. Kuehner

THE CASE OF THE DISINTERESTED TWO
STATES: NEUMEIER V. KUEEHNER
Hans W. Baade*

A

mEIcANs are known to be rather
dian. 1 To take but one example:

uninterested in things CanaNone of my 150 students in
Conflicts last semester could identify Sir John A. MacDonald, Canada's George Washington and architect of the British North America
Act. 2 Some connected him with a well-known hamburger chain;
others prudently assumed that he was a British (in distressingly many
cases: an English) authority on the conflict of laws; and one student
with nary a thought to what went on at Glencoe, committed the
ultimate sin of linking him to Campbell's Soups.8 Yet there was at
least one near miss: the student who thought that Sir John A. was
the "Prime Minister (sic) of Ontario who wrote that province's guest
statute."
The reference is, of course, to what is now § 132(3) of the Ontario
Highway Traffic Act. 4 It should not really come as a surprise that
this statute is the best-known Canadian statute south of the borderbetter known even than the B.N.A. Act.5 Nor, indeed, should we be
too astonished to see Sir John take second place to Mr. Hepburn
under whose premiership the Ontario guest statute was passed, for
ever since Professor Linden's famous indiscretion, it has been
LL.B., LL.M., Duke University School of Law. The author is currently Albert
Sidney Burleson Professor of Law at the University of Texas School of Law and was
formerly a member of the Faculty of Law of the University of Toronto.
1. Cf. Miles, Canadian Studies in the United States: Challenge and Frustration,27
INT'L J. (Can.) 250 (1972).
2. 30 & 31 Vic., c. 8, as amended (Imp.) (The British North America Act, 1867);
D. CRmIGroN, JoHN A. MACDONALD (2 vols., 1952 & 1955).
3. This is an oblique reference to In re Dorrance'sEstate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 803
(1982), New Jersey v. Pennsylvania, 287 US. 580 (1932), and In re Dorrance's Estate,
115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 A. 601 (1984). For background, see Campbell's Soup, 12 FORTUNE

69 (Nov. 1935).
4. R.S.O. 1960, c. 172, § 105(2), as amended by Ont. Stat. 1966, c. 64, § 20(2). This
subsection, now R.S.O. 1970, c. 202, § 132(3), reads as follows:
Notwithstanding subsection 1, the owner or driver of a motor vehicle, other
than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying passengers for compensation,
is not liable for any loss or damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the death
of any person being carried in, or upon, or entering, or getting on to, or alighting from the motor vehicle, except where such loss or damage was caused or
contributed to by the gross negligence of the driver of the motor vehicle.
5. The British North America Act, 1867, note 2 supra.
6. Linden, Comment, 40 CAN. B. Rav. 284, 286, n.11 (1962):
A prominent Toronto negligence lawyer tells a story about Mitchell Hepburn
who had just been elected Premier of Ontario when the subsection was passed.
It is said that he had vowed to pass such a statute if he ever became Premier
because he had once been sued by two hitchhikers who were injured while gratuitous passengers in his automobile.
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fashionable to see a personal link between the Premier and the
statute. And the Ontario guest statute is, of course, the most frequently litigated piece of Canadian legislation in the United States.
It has been judicially considered no less than three times by the New
8
York Court of Appeals7 and once by the Supreme Court of Michigan.
In addition to these four decisions of courts of last resort, there have
been a number of published decisions of intermediate appellate
courts; 9 virtually all of these decisions have given rise to extensive
academic comment.'0 It is probably no exaggeration to say that for
some time after Babcock v. Jackson" broke the ice in 1963, the
Ontario guest statute was litigated more frequently in the United
States than in Canada.'2 Be that as it may: there can be little doubt
that the legislative policy behind this Canadian statute and its scope
for conflict-of-laws purposes have been discussed more widely, both
judicially and by commentators, in the United States than in Canada.
Having had my say on several of these American decisions, 8 I do
not feel tempted to undertake an in-depth analysis of the most recent
addition to the list. I am content to leave the general exposition of
the governmental-interests approach to this particular case in Professor Sedler's capable hands, 4 and instead propose to limit myself
7. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963);
Mfacey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966); Neumeier
v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
8. Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969).
9. See, e.g., Kell v. Henderson, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (3d Dept.
1966); Arbuthnot v. Albright, 316 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1970).
10. See, Symposium, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLum. L. Rxv. 1212
(1963); Rosenberg, An Opinion for the New York Court of Appeals, 67 COLUm. L.
REv. 459 (1967); Trautman, A Comment, 67 COLUm. L. REv. 465 (1967); Baade,
Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress? Reflections on Reading Cavers, The
Choice of Law Process, 46 TEx. L. Rav. 141, 170-75 (1967); Baade, Judge Keating and
the Conflict of Laws, 36 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 10, 17-26 (1969).
11. Note 7 supra.
12. A search of the Ontario Reports through [1972] 2 O.R., of the Ontario Weeldy
Notes through [1962] O.W.N., when they were discontinued, and of the Canadian
Supreme Court Reports, has yielded a total of 51 decisions involving the judicial consideration of the Ontario guest statute, representing 43 cases. These include four
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada: McLean v. Pettigrew, [1945] 2 D.L.R. 65
(1944); Ouelette v. Johnson, [1963] 37 D.L.R.2d 107; Cooperators Insurance Ass'n v.
Kearney, [1965] 48 D.L.R.2d 1 (1964); and Teasdale v. Maclntyre, [1968] 69 D.L.R.2d 1.

By far the largest number of reported cases (17), including two of the Supreme
Court decisions (Ouelette and Teasdale), involve the interpretation of the term "compensation". See, e.g., Platt v. Katz, [1971] 15 D.L.R.3d 296 (1970); Feldstein v. Alloy
Metal Sales Ltd. and Mathews, [1962] 32 D.L.R.2d 628. There were six guest statute
cases decided between 1963 and 1969, but since that time, there has been a marked

increase of cases, mainly concerning the interpretation of "gross negligence" (nine
cases to date). See notes 26 and 27 infra.
13. See Baade, supra note 10.
14. Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the Unprovided For Case: Reflections on
Neumeier v. Kuehner, supra, this volume.
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to some brief remarks on three subjects: the purpose or purposes of

the Ontario statute as revealed by its legislative history, the issue of
contribution between joint tortfeasors, and the puzzling phenomenon of the disinterested two states.
I. 25 GEo. V, cH. 26, SEc. 11

(ONT.),

As

AMENDED

The original version of what is now the Ontario guest statute is
contained in Sec. 11 of the Highway Traffic Amendment Act, 1935,
which received the Royal Assent from the Lieutenant-Governor on
April 18, 1935.15 This provision corresponds literally to Sec. 10 of a
bill (No. 82) to amend the Highway Traffic Act, which was introduced by Mr. Thomas B. McQueston (Lib. Hamilton-Wentworth),
the Minister of Highways in Mr. Hepburn's administration. It is
thus clearly, and indeed quite naturally in a system of parliamentary
government such as that prevailing in Ontario, a Government measure.' 6 The bill received its first, second, and final readings on March
29, April 10, and April 12, 1935, respectively; there were no amendments between the first and final readings, although one section was
added so as to take care of a private member's bill.17 Unfortunately,
as there are no verbatim Hansards for 1935, we have little information as to the views of the government of the day, and of the Legislative Assembly, as to the purpose or purposes of the bill. However, in
the Newspaper Hansard of March 30, 1935, i.e., the day immediately
following the introducing of Mr. McQueston's bill, we find the statement that ". . . the amendment is the answer of the department to
the insurance companies' plans to double the passenger liability insurance rates in the Toronto area on April 1V"18
15. Ont. Stat. 1935, c. 26. In connection with the following, I gratefully acknowledge
the invaluable research assistance of Mr. Roy E. Stephenson, presently a student at the
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
RESPONSiBLE GOVERNMENT iN ONTARIo, ch. 5. (1969),
16. See generally, F. ScmHNDELER,

especially at 143-45.
17. Bill 65, introduced by Ian T. Shrachan (Lib., St. Georges), which dealt with
the quaint subject of alarm bells, gongs, or horns on motor vehicles, bicycles, and
tricycles. This became § 5 of Ont. Stat. 1935, c. 26; see O.R.S. 1970, c. 202, § 49(4).
18. Newspaper Hansard, March 30, 1935. A substantially identical bill (Bill No. 78)
had been introduced in the 1934 session of the Legislative Assembly. The learned
Editor of the FORTNIOHTLY LAW JouRNAL, Mr. R. M. W. Chitty, promptly noted that

the "passenger hazard had been productive of frauds upon insurance companies" which

"would be just as glad to get rid of the passenger risk," and attacked the bill, inter alia,
as an attempt to make the majority suffer for the fraud of the few. 3 FORTNIGITLY L.J.
241 (1934). A resolution adopted by the Law Students' Ass'n of Hamilton, Ont., also
opposed the proposed amendment of the Highway Traffic Act, noting that it was
"legislation for the benefit of a class, insurance companies, against the rest of the
subjects." Id. at 312. The bill was withdrawn in response to this criticism, and a

legislative committee appointed to study the matter. The committee filed a report
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This statement has to be read together with the following observation by a highly qualified observer in a reasonably contemporaneous issue of the leading Canadian academic legal periodical:
"Undoubtedly the object of this provision is to prevent the fraudulent assertion of claims by passengers, in collusion with drivers,
against insurance companies ... "19
We must keep in mind, of course, that we could not, as counsel in
Canadian litigation, set forth this legislative history in our factum
without inviting judicial displeasure. Anglo-Canadian law does not
20
permit recourse to legislative history for purposes of interpretation;
and while this restrictive practice seems to be presently crumbling, 21
we can hardly expect that the sort of circumstantial evidence presented above would be deemed relevant by a Canadian court. Still, in
so far as the legislative purpose of foreign statutes is pertinent for
choice-of-law purposes in the United States, and to the extent that
legislative history serves to illuminate such purposes, I submit that
American courts can look at foreign legislative history even if the
courts of the relevant foreign country would not do so. This approach
is somewhat akin to ascertaining the governmental interests of a
noting that while 50 per cent of Ontario motorists were insured at the time, passenger
claims thereunder amounted to one-third of all claims. PROVINCE OF ONTARIo, La.isLATivE ASSEmBLY, [1934] JoURNALS OF THE HOUSE 155; see also MacDonald, The Negligence
Action and the Legislature, 13 CAN. B. Ray. 535, 546, n.62 (1935). No legislation followed that report, however, as there was a dissolution later that year.
19. Robinette, Ontario, Survey of Canadian Legislation, 1 U. TORONTO L.J. 364, 366
(1936). The author of that comment, J. J. Robinette, was at that time the editor of
the Ontario Law Reports, a member of the Faculty of Law of Osgoode Hall, in practice
in Toronto. He is presently one of the leaders of the Ontario bar. See also Maclntyre,
The Rationale of Imputed Negligence, 5 U. ToRoNTo L.J. 368, 371 (1944): ". . . the
legislature, yielding to pressure which made two arguments-(l) hardship on a generous
driver, and (2) (the real one), that the action provided a fruitful field for collusive
suits against the driver's insurer-abrogated that common-law right of action." The
only source on which a somewhat different conclusion could be based is the reference
of Ferguson, J., in Feldstein v. Alloy Metal Sales Ltd. and Mathews, [1962] 32 D.L.R.2d
628, 636-37, to "the supposed injustice to a good Samaritan who picked up a personto use the vernacular-as a hitchhiker, being held liable if through his negligence on
the journey, the passenger suffered injuries" in connection with the 1935 amendment.
In view of the massive contemporaneous evidence to the contrary, see note 18 supra,
I do not find this dictum convincing--if, indeed, it was intended to state a causal
relationship. It has seemingly passed unnoticed until now. This is not to say, however,
that the good samaritan argument may not have been actually used in the Legislative
Assembly; cf. the somewhat cryptic remarks of Mr. Chitty in 4 FoRTNIGHmY L.J. 289-90
(1935). That would only serve to underline Dean Wright's characterization of the 1935
amendments as one of the "most vicious pieces of legislation which an active insurance
lobby was able to foist on an unsuspecting public." Comment, 23 CAN. B. Rv. 344,
347 (1945) (emphasis supplied).
20. P. M.LAXWELL, INTrRPRErATiON OF STATUTES 50-51 (12th ed. 1969); Attorney General of Canada v. Reader's Digest Ass'n (Canada), [1961] S.C.R. 775.
21. Bloom, Law Commission: Interpretationof Statutes, 33 MOD. L. REv. 197 (1970);
cf. Kilgour, The Rule Against The Use of Legislative History: Canon of Construction
or Counsel of Caution?" 30 CAN. B. Rzv. 769 (1952).
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foreign state for choice-of-law purposes even if that state follows
blindly jurisdiction-selective choice-of-law rules,2 2 and is clearly impermissible only when the courts of the enacting state have specifically
addressed themselves to the purpose of the statute at issue.
It is one thing to use the Newspaper Hansards and contemporary
academic comment in order to ascertain the purpose of an Ontario
enactment; it is quite another to dignify apocryphal Osgoode Hale
or Queen's Park rumors in a like manner. This refers to Professor
Linden's anecdote reference to the old timers' rumor that the 1935
guest statute was enacted only because Premier Hepburn, having
himself been sued by two hitch-hikers, had set his mind then to
prevent the recurrence of such acts of ingratitude. 23 There is nothing
in the record to substantiate this story. Even if it were true, however,
it would show no more than the Premier's personal motives for
lending his support to a legislative measure that was designed to keep
down insurance rates. These private motives, I submit, are irrelevant
for the purpose of statutory interpretation.
The 1966 amendments have a somewhat more fully documented
legislative history. On February 2, 1966, Mr. Elmer Sopha (Lib.,
Sudbury), a leading member of the Ontario bar with a large civil
litigation practice, introduced Bill No. 20, which provided for the
straight repeal of section 105(2) of the Highway Traffic Act. This bill
never received the second reading that was originally scheduled for
the following day. On May 24, 1966, the Minister of Transport, Mr.
Haskett, introduced Bill No. 121, which contained a number of
proposed amendments to the Highway Traffic Act. One of these,
which emerged from Committee without amendment, changed section 105(2) so as to permit recovery by the guest for damage caused by
the gross negligence of the host-driver. Mr. Sopha asked one question
as to the gratuitous passenger section, but this was only for purposes
of information. The bill received its second and final readings on
June 1 and 23, 1966, and was assented to on July 8, 1966.24 A
22. See Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 525-27, 263 A.2d 129, 136-37
(1970); Baade, Judge Keating, supra note 10, at 35, n.116.
23. Note 6 supra. Professor Linden does not appear to attach any legal significance
to this anecdote. See A. LINDEN, THE REPORT OF THE OSCOODE HALL STUDY ON CObtPENSATION FOR VIxIMS OF AuToMOBiLE ACCmENTS, ch. IV, p. 5 (1965): "The policy
reason for this provision is the fear of fraudulent and collusive claims by friends and

members of the driver's family. By barring altogether the right of action of gratuitous
passengers, the danger of collusion is said to decrease."
24. Ont. Stat. 1966, c. 64, § 20(2); now O.R.S. 1970, c. 202, § 132(3). See, in this
connection, the remark by Hughes, J., in Conrad v. Crawford, [1972J 22 D.L.R.3d 386,
392 (1971): "The section . . . radically changes the policies of various ministries as

maintained by the Legislative Assembly of Ontario for over 40 years, brings the
situation of gratuitous passengers into line with that prevailing in other common law
Provinces in Canada ..
"
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companion bill which brought the Negligence Act into line with this
amendment by permitting the recovery of damages, contribution,
and indemnity where the host-driver was grossly negligent, was introduced by the Attorney-General, Mr. Wishart, on June 9, 1966 (Bill
No. 170). On first reading, the Attorney-General was invited by Mr.
Singer (Lib., Downsview) to define "gross negligence" as defined in
the bill but declined, saying that "the courts have considered the
term gross negligence down through the years in relation to motor
vehicle cases; perhaps not in this province so much, but in many
other circumstances. .. 25 The same point was made at second reading by Mr. Renwick (NDP, Riverdale), who added that he saw "no
reason whatsoever for making this distinction in an already complicated field of law to provide for recovery only in cases of gross negligence." The Attorney-General replied as follows:2 6
I must also admit that it may increase to some degree the
extent of litigation in automobile accident claims. We are
opening here a new field in giving to a gratuitous passenger
the right to recover where the owner or driver is guilty of gross
negligence but we must, I think, leave that definition to the
courts, as is done in the whole field of accidents and in negligence.
We have not extended the principle of negligence to any
degree whatever, because I think to do so would be an unwise provision.
This legislative history has to be assessed against the background
not only of the 1935 enactment but also of the work of the Select
Committee on Automobile Insurance appointed by the Ontario
Legislative Assembly. In its Interim Report of March 21, 1961, the
Select Committee expressed its belief that it was "important to
consider the desirability of giving a right of recovery to gratuitous
passengers upon a finding of gross negligence or wanton or wilful
misconduct on the part of a driver." 27 It would appear to be this
25. Ontario Legislature, Hansard, 4472 (June 9, 1966).
26. Id. (June 17, 1966). The Attorney-General's concession as to the probable
effect of the 1966 amendment on the volume of litigation was to be quickly confirmed

by events. The following cases deal with the distinction between simple and gross
negligence: Gordon v. Nutbean, [1969] 5 D.L.R.3d 503; Augeropoulos v. Karananos,
[1969] 6 D.L.R.3d 34; Roy v. McEwan, [1969] 6 D.L.R.3d 43; Mudrazia v. Hoijevac,
[1970] 8 D.L.R.3d 221 (1969); Halliday v. Essex, [1971] 3 O.R. 621; Conrad v. Crawford,
[19 72] 22 D.L.R.3d 386 (1971); Doxator v. Burch, [1972] 23 D.L.R.3d 52 (1971); Jackson
v. Millar, [1972] 25 D.L.R.3d 161 (1971); Tucker v. Latt, [1972] 25 D.L.R.3d 633. In
all of these cases, there was a finding of gross negligence. In Doxator, where the defendant had run into a bridge abutment, the finding of gross negligence was made by
resort to res ipsa loquitur.
27. IECISLATIvE AssEmLY OF ONrrAso, SLaar Commrrrm oN AurromoBmE INSURANCE,
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recommendation that was implemented in 1966; its nexus to the insurance factor seems obvious.
In conclusion, I submit that the sole apparent legislative purpose
of the Ontario guest statute as enacted in 1935 and as amended in
1966 is to protect insurance companies against claims which would
necessitate an increase of motor vehicle insurance rates in Ontario.
II. How ABOUT THE CHOO-CHOO?
Even if the sole purpose of the Ontario guest statute is indeed the
protection of the Ontario insurance industry, it does not follow that
this purpose is irrelevant in the instant case. Arthur Kuehner, a
resident of Buffalo and driving a New York-registered and insured
station wagon, picked up his Canadian nephew by marriage, Aime
Nuemeier, at the latter's house in Fort Erie, Ont., for a ride to Long
Beach, Ont., where Kuehner owned some summer cottages. The
accident-fatal to both Kuehner and Neumeier-was a collision with
a Canadian National Railway Company28 train at a grade crossing
in Sterkston, Ont. Mrs. Joan Neumeier, Aime's widow and administratrix, sought to recover damages from the CNR, as well as from the
Kuehner Estate, alleging negligence by both. CNR, while denying
negligence on its part, cross-claimed against the Kuehner estate for
20
injury to its Diesel engine and for contribution.
The railroad is, of course, as Canadian as the Maple Leaf; and the
accident occurred in Ontario on a wholly intra-Canadian and even
intra-Provincial run. Decedent Neumeier was a Canadian citizen and
Ontario resident; his widow, the administratrix of his Ontario estate,
was at all times here material a resident of that Province. As between
these parties and with respect to this accident, Ontario law has a
strong prima facie claim of applicability. What, then, is the Ontario
rule as to the liability of joint tortfeasors towards the guest in guest
statute cases?
J., in Mudrazia v.
Holjevac, [1970] 8 D.L.R.3d 221 (1969):
Counsel for the defendant strongly urged upon me that the failure to
observe a stop sign ought not to constitute gross negligence and since Ontario
has adopted recently gross negligence as a basis of recovery by gratuitous passengers he urged that it becomes of importance to the insurance industry to
know its position when defending such claims.
The impact of the legislative change on insurance companies (but also on defendants)
is likely to be quite substantial. In Doxator and Tucker there was recovery in excess
INTERim REPORT, p. 5 (March, 1961). See also the remark of Haines,

of $180,000 and over $200,000, respectively; in Jackson recovery was over $220,000, even

after a 10 per cent deduction for contributory negligence (leaning on door and not
using seat belt).
28. Hereinafter CNR.
29. Record on Appeal 32, 33-5, Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d

454, 385 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
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The Negligence Act, as last amended in 1966,80 lays down four
rules pertinent for present purposes. First, joint tortfeasors are liable
jointly and severally towards the person injured. Secondly, as between themselves, they are entitled to contribution and indemnity in
accordance with the degree of fault. Third, in an automobile guest's
action, no damages, contribution, or indemnity are recoverable for
injury caused by the simple negligence of the host-driver. Fourth, the
third rule does not apply if the host-driver is grossly negligent. It
follows that if in the instant case, both Kuehner and the railroad were
negligent but Kuehner was not grossly negligent, the railroad is
liable towards the Neumeier estate only for that portion of the
damage which is attributable to its own negligence. 81 If, on the other
hand, Kuehner should be found to have been grossly negligent, the
CNR is liable jointly and severally with his estate. As a practical
matter, this means primary liability beyond the individual defendant's insurance coverage and other resources (the Neumeier estate
is claiming damages in the amount of $500,000). It seems somewhat
odd, at first sight, that the third party should actually be in a worse
position if the other tortfeasor acts with less care, but on closer
inspection, this emerges as a logical consequence of the joint and
several liability of (notionally) joint tortfeasors.
New York's rules on contribution and indemnity have been completely reshaped (or, perhaps, even revolutionized) by the recent decision of the Court of Appeals in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.32 There
is still joint and several liability towards the injured party, but as
between themselves, joint and concurrent tortfeasors are entitled to
30. R.S.O. 1960, c. 261 §§ 2 & 3, as last amended by Ont. Stat. 1966, c. 98, § 1, now
R.S.O. 1970, c. 296 § 2(2). As regards the legislative history of the 1966 amendments, see
notes 25 & 26 supra. The crucial provision reads as follows:
In any action brought for any loss or damage resulting from bodily injury
to, or the death of any person being carried in, or upon, or entering, or getting
on to, or alighting from a motor vehicle other than a vehicle operated in the
business of carrying passengers for compensation, and the owner or driver of
the motor vehicle that the injured or deceased person was being carried in, or
upon, or entering, or getting on to, or alighting from is one of the persons found
to be at fault or negligent, no damages are, and no contribution or indemnity
is, recoverable for the portion of the loss or damage caused by the fault or
negligence of such owner or driver except, subject to subsection 4, where such
portion of the loss or damage was caused by the gross negligence of the driver
of the motor vehicle, and the portion of the loss or damage so caused by the
fault or negligence of such owner or driver shall be determined although such
owner or driver is not a party to the action.
31. For illustrations involving collisions with railroads, see Gives v. C.N.R. [1941]
4 D.L.R. 625 (railroad 20 per cent negligent; driver 80 per cent negligent; recovery of
20 per cent of the damages from the C.N.R. only); Verroche v. Russell & N.S. & T. Ry.,
[1946] 2 D.L.R. 348 (70 per cent recovery against railroad).
32. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972); see also Kelly v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334 N.YS.2d 851 (1972).
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contribution in accordance with the degree of fault attributable to
each. In other words, as regards the first two rules enumerated above,
Ontario and New York law are substantially identical. There is, of
course, also identity as to the fourth rule: a New York joint tortfeasor in a purely domestic case would be jointly and severally liable
towards the automobile guest, injured by his fault and the gross
negligence of the host-driver, but could now obtain contribution (no
doubt a hefty one) from the driver.3 Rule Three, on the other hand,
does not apply in terms because there is no guest statute in New York.
But how would New York deal with the basic question of contribution by a joint tortfeasor who, because of a relationship covered by an
insulating rule, is not himself liable to the victim?
Part of the answer to this question might be found in Dole itself,
where defendant Dow was successful in claiming over against the
employer of plaintiff's decedent who would not himself have been
liable towards the estate in tort, as the New York workmen's compensation law provided the exclusive remedy between these two parties3 4
The Court disposed of this issue by holding, on the strength of the
Westchester Light'g Co. case, 5 that a third party suing an employer
in circumstances such as these is seeking to enforce an independent
duty or obligation and not the workman's claim. It expressly rejected
the seemingly sensible view, set forth in Chief Judge Crane's dissent
in Westchester, that the employer's liability as an indemnitor or
contributor should be limited in amount to workmen's compensation
36
coverage.
Since there is no guest statute in New York, and since intra-family
immunity was abandoned before the recent liberalization of the law
of contribution and indemnity, 7 the question here posed can still
not be answered with full assurance. The safest conclusion would
appear to be that while New York would probably follow, at least
in principle, the general rule that there can be no contribution from
one who is not himself liable towards the person injured, 8 this rule
will not apply wherever a tortfeasor owes what is called an "independent duty or obligation."3 9 It perhaps follows that if Arthur Kueh33. See Comment, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 815 (1972); Note, 25 VAND. L. Rav. 1284 (1972);
Note, 37 ALBANY L. Rv. 154 (1972).
34. N. Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 11 (McKinney 1965).
35. Westchester Light'g Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y.
175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).
36. 278 N.Y. at 184-85, 15 N.E.2d at 571.
57. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
38. Cf. Comment, supra note 33, at 828, n.90; see generally, Note, 52 CORNELL L.Q.
407 (1967).
39. Note 37 supra.
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ner's negligence was casual in his collision with the CNR train, CNR
could obtain contribution from his estate under New York law even
if, as between Kuehner and his guest Neumeier, the former is
immunized from liability, but this is a somewhat doubtful conclusion
since there is only partial immunity in workmen's compensation cases.
However-and this is the other side of the same coin-if the CNR
was itself negligent toward Neumeier, Kuehner's concurrent negligence (whether simple or gross) clearly will not, under New York law,
reduce the liability of the railroad towards the guest-passenger even
if the latter could not recover from his host.
To sum up: Under both New York and Ontario law, the CNR is
liable towards the Neumeier estate only if it was negligent. Under
New York law, this liability is unaffected by any immunities of joint
tortfeasors. Under Ontario law, however, the immunity conferred
upon a merely negligent host-driver by the guest statute reduces,
pro tanto, the liability of the railroad towards the guest. There is no
joint and several liability in this case, as the host-driver is immunized
from both liability and contribution. If, however, the railroad was
negligent and the host-driver was grossly negligent, the railroad is
jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the damage under
both New York law and Ontario law, but is, again under both laws,
entitled to a contribution from the other tortfeasor based on an apportionment of the degrees of fault.
It follows that the difference between the Ontario and the New
York schemes of joint and several liability and contribution becomes
material only if the CNR is found to have been negligent and if
Arthur Kuehner is also found to be ordinarily but not grossly negligent. In that case, under Ontario law, the railroad is liable only for
the quantum of damage attributable to it, while under New York
law, it is liable for the whole damage suffered by Mr. Neumeier's
estate, possibly subject, however, to contribution as between the tortfeasors. Is there any justification for the application of the New York
rule in the present situation?
Contribution, one supposes, is one subject where students of the
conflict of laws prefer their own swamps or quagmires to whatever
may pass for terra firma among torts scholars. 40 Still, the reason for
the difference between the New York and the Ontario rules on con40. PROSSER, InterstatePublication,51 MicH. L. REv. 959, 971 (1953):

The realm of the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about
mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon,
Cf. W. PRossER, Torts 305 et seq. (4th ed. 1971).
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tribution seems simple enough. Ontario seeks to keep down insurance rates by eliminating liability for mere negligence on the part of
host-drivers. This policy in favor of underwriters in such situations is
so strong that it inures to the benefit not only of the host-driver but
also of third party joint tortfeasors who, since as a rule they are the
drivers of the "other car", are similarly likely to carry liability insurance.4 1 New York, on the other hand, is interested first in full
compensation for the victim, and secondly in a fair apportionment of
the burden between the wrongdoers as among themselves. These
interests are so strong that they override, as a practical matter, any
relation-based immunizing rules which would protect one of the tortfeasors in a two party-situation.
Ontario clearly has an interest in applying its immunizing rule in
the instant case to the advantage of the CNR, a local defendant. This
is so even though Kuehner carried New York, not Ontario, insurance,
for the CNR either carries Ontario insurance, or is self-insured in
reliance on Ontario law, or belongs to that lucky category of parties
who merely benefit more or less accidentally from a legislative policy
because effective policies, perforce, must be applied with some generality. But insulating the railroad from liability for the damage
caused by an ordinarily negligent host-driver to his guest has no
necessary consequences, as seen from Ontario, for the question actually decided by the Court of Appeals in Neumeier v. Kuehner.42 If
interest analysis should call for the application of New York law with
respect to the guest statute issue, it would still be neither illogical nor
unfair for the Ontario court to apply the Ontario Negligence Act 48 so

as to insulate an Ontario party from joint and several liability for
damages caused by the out-of-province host-driver. While this would
limit the number of pockets to choose from, the Ontario automobile
guest had no expectation as to this particular Ontario purse. Furthermore, the result is not unfair as between the joint tortfeasors, as the
fairest of all solutions for the distribution of liability for harm jointly
or concurrently caused, apportionment in accordance with the degree
of fault, will then be applied quite radically.
These considerations would appear to indicate the parameters of
New York's interest on the issue of contribution. The compensatory
policy of full recovery (compensatory because it makes little sense to
41. See Maclntyre, supra note 19, at 371, where it is said that the Ontario solution
"overshoots the legitimate argument of the insurance companies" as to the collusion
factor. Cf. Mr. Chitty's comments in 3 FORTNIGTLY L.J. 242 (1934) and 4 id. 289 (1935).
42. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
43. Note 30 supra.
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admonish someone to avoid someone else's concurrent fault) can
hardly be intended to afford a broader basis for recovery by Ontario
victims from Ontario defendants with respect to Ontario accidents
than the one afforded by Ontario law. Nor is the result unfair if the
New York party should, by an analysis such as that suggested by Professor Sedler,44 still be held liable if only ordinarily negligent. Again,
each party defendant would be held liable only for damages caused
by it. New York would rationally advance its policy of admonishing
New Yorkers to drive carefully everywhere, 45 and it would also
afford compensation to an automobile accident victim in a situation
where New York considers such compensation to be desirable. These
arguments are, of course, not entirely compelling, and they have been
rejected, at least inferentially, by the Kuehner majority. However,
in the present context of seeking to determine the scope of New
York's rule as to contribution-an issue which by definition would
become controversial only if Kuehner had been held to be ordinarily
negligent and still liable-either the former or the latter argument
must be accepted as persuasive.
In conclusion, it is submitted that while there is a crucial difference between New York and Ontario law on the issue of liability of,
and contribution between, joint tortfeasors where one of them is
insulated from liability towards the victim, Ontario's interest would
be served, and New York's interest at least marginally advanced, by
applying the Ontario rule in the instant case. It follows that if
Arthur Kuehner should be found to have been ordinarily but not
grossly negligent, the CNR should not be held liable, either in
Ontario or in New York, for the quantum of damages attributable to
him.
III.

WINDFALL OR ALTRUISM?

I do not suppose that civilization will come to an end whichever way this case is decided.
0. W. Holmes, Jr.46
The third remarkable feature of Neumeier v. Kuehner47 is the
odd fact that if Arthur Kuehner should be found to have been ordinarily but not grossly negligent, neither New York nor Ontario
44. Note 14 supra.
45. See Note, 37 ALBAN L. RPv. 175, 186 (1972).
46. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 US. 562, 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting). There are still
traces of a rumor that he used much stronger language in the oral version of his
dissent.
47. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
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would have much of a stake in the actual outcome. No New York
resident would be deprived of compensation provided at least partially in the public interest if the Ontario guest statute defense were
to succeed; no Ontario underwriter would be unfairly surprised, and
no Ontario insurance rate structure adversely affected, if this defense
were to fail. To be sure, New York has some marginal interest in
admonishing New Yorkers to drive carefully everywhere, and Ontario has the twin interests in admonition and compensation whereever its liability-insulating policy is inapplicable. But as seen from
Ontario, these policies should not suffice to decide the case. Even an
uninsured Ontario host-driver benefits from the Ontario guest
statute; and it seems somewhat grasping, if not chauvinistic, to treat
the insured foreigner worse than the uninsured Ontarian-especially
since the law strongly disapproves of the latter.48 Such a disposition
of the case by an Ontario court would evoke the image of the hick
probate judge who highhandedly pretermits a Soviet heir because,
according to his limited lights, there is no such thing as private
49
property in the Soviet Union.
This should serve to point to one insight in no-interest or littleinterest cases: One should not be altruistic with other people's
money. If the Neumeier estate can recover only by a generous interpretation of New York's potentially relevant policies and if this
interpretation has not as yet been adopted by New York, Ontario
would not be wise to take the first step. (It would in all likelihood
50 or
not do so merely by applying the rule of McLean v. Pettigrew
some of the many variants of Chaplin v. Boys8 ' but this is not relevant for purposes of interest analysis which assumes that a sound and
rational method will eventually find acceptance even in AngloCanadian conflict law.52 ) As a rule of thumb, the forum whose
citizen stands to benefit from an altruistic interpretation of another
state's interests should wait for, and then defer to, the disposition of
like matters by that other state. If the instant case had been brought
in Ontario rather than in New York, it should have been stayed or
48. Through the imposition of an uninsured motor vehicle fee and financial responsibility requirements, Ontario virtually achieves compulsory insurance, with about
98 per cent of all Ontario vehicles insured as of 1965. See Linden, supra note 23, at
10-11.
49. Such an example is recorded by Berman, Soviet Heirs in American Courts, 62
COLUm. L. REv. 257, 263, n.23 (1962).
50. [1945] 2 D.L.R.2d 65 (1944); see also Gagnon v. Lecavalier, [1967) 63 D.L.R.2d
12.
51. [1971] A.C. 356 (1969); see J. Momus, TIHE CoFiucr OF LAWS 268-73 (1971).
52. Cf. the seemingly somewhat premature article by McDougall, Conflicts Law in
Canada: The Calm Before the Storm? 1967 U.B.C. L. REv.-C. DE D. 287 (1967); Castel,
Comment, 29 CAN. B.U. Ray. 632 (1971).
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dismissed without prejudice on forum non conveniens grounds;53 if

brought now, it should be dismissed with prejudice if Arthur
Kuehner was only ordinarily negligent.
This last assertion seems to accept that Neumeier54 was correctly
decided. On closer inspection, however, the point here taken is of
more limited scope. We may or may not agree with Chief Judge
Fuld's curious amalgam of interest analysis, rule-positivism, and
self-congratulation;r we may be against or possibly even for 56 Judge

Breitel's rather quaint anti-academic outburst.5 7 All that is debatable
and is, indeed, debated by others in these pages; and the blemishes of
style and analysis on the conflicts level are probably such that one
should hope for the speedy arrival of what a wise man has felicitously termed "creative forgetfulness."5 8 But to the extent that the

Court of Appeals has undertaken to define the scope of the New York
53. Pursuant to Rule 25(1) of the OrrAiao RuLEs or PRACTICE AND PRocmEua,
service of process out of Ontario "may" be allowed, inter alia, where the action is
founded on a tort committed within Ontario, id. (1.). The word "may" signifies discretion to determine whether Ontario is the forum conveniens; see, e.g., Aitken v.
Gardiner, [1953] O.W.N. 555, 556 (Marriott, Master). No position is taken on the question of whether the exercise of discretion would be appropriate in the instant case
as a matter of Ontario law.
54. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
55. There are no less than three references in Neumeier v. Kuehner to Reese,
Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of Law, 71 CoLum. L. Rzv. 548 (1971), the last of them a
quotation expressing approval of the three rules recommended by the Chief Judge
in his concurring opinion in Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 596, 249 N.E.2d 594, 301
N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969). This concurring opinion, too, is quoted at great length, and the
opinion concludes with the following sentence from the Reese eulogy: "One can well
understand the relief with which the trial judge seized upon Judge Fuld's third rule
and followed it by holding the Ontario statute applicable." (The reference is to the
trial judge in the instant case.) 31 N.Y.2d at 124, 127, 129-30, 286 N.E.2d at 455, 457,
457-59, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 67, 69, 70-71.
56. One supporter might be Mr. Justice Black, of the Supreme Court of Michigan,
in whose view all the trouble started "since Babcock v. Jackson was trumpeted in certain law reviews," and who opposes the "overrulement" of previous Michigan authority
so as to avoid the "quagmire of unanswered and perceivably unanswerable questions
arising out of the proposed new doctrine." Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 519,
170 N.W.2d 137, 139-40 (1969).
57. I refer especially to (1) the assertion that "the instability and uncertainty
created by the recent departures from traditional lex loci delictus" arose mainly "because the departures have been accompanied by an unprecedented competition of
ideologies, largely of academic origin, to explain and reconstruct a whole field of law,
each purporting or aspiring to achieve a single universal principle"; and (2) the
statement that troubles were intensified when the "new doctrine had been displaced
by a still newer one, that of governmental interests developed most extensively by
the late Brainerd Currie, and the court was deeply engaged in probing the psychological
motivation of legislatures of other States in enacting statutes restricting recoveries in
tort cases." 31 N.Y.2d at 130-31, 286 N.E.2d at 459, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 72. Judge Breitel
does not deem it necessary to cite any of the works thus referred to, but I am not
recommending the academic remedy proposed by Horowitz & Netterville, Unprivileged
Refusal to Reap Where One Has Not Sown, 12 J. LEcAL ED. 201 (1959).
58. I am unable to locate the original source but gladly cede priority. Baade,
Foreword, Jurimetrics,28 L. & Cowrmip. PROB. 1, 3 (1963).
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automobile host-guest rule in concert with the New York compulsory
insurance scheme and has, purely as a matter of teleological interpretation of these rules, denied their altruistic interpretation in favor
of guest statute state victims of New Yorkers in guest statute state
accidents, that is the end of the matter for us. The wisdom of any
conceivable choice-of-law rule is debatable at the present, and is
likely to remain so for some time. But on this level of analysis, the
views of courts of last resort as to the purpose of their own statutes
and judge-made rules of domestic law must be accepted as given. In
fact, we should always be grateful for such views, for without them,
we are forced to engage in speculation; and there is no assurance that
commentators will do much better at this than the Court of Appeals
did in the instant case with respect to the Ontario guest statute.60
In conclusion, one more point deserves brief mention. How important is the category of "no interest" cases, and what is its significance for governmental-interests analysis? It will be recalled that
Brainerd Currie achieved his major conceptual breakthrough in his
60 a contracts case posing the perennial
analysis of Milliken v. Pratt,
question of the capacity of married women as sureties for their
husbands' obligations.6 1 Professor Currie quite convincingly demonstrated that depending on whether the married woman lived in the
state affording such protection, all conceivable fact-law patterns
could be classified as true- and false-conflicts situations. 2 There is
no room in this analysis for no-interest cases simply because wherever
the state concerned in the welfare of the married woman is not the
59. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 124, 286 N.E.2d 454, 455, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64,
66-67:
It is worth noting, at this point, that, although our court originally considered
that the sole purpose of the Ontario statute was to protect Ontario defendants
and their insurers against collusive claims . . . "Further research
* 0 has
revealed the distinct possibility that one purpose, and perhaps the only purpose,
of the statute was to protect owners and drivers against ungrateful guests."
(Reese, Chief Judge Fuld, and Choice of Law, 71 Col. L. Rev. 548, 558; see
Trautman, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson: A Comment, 67 Col. L. Rev. 465,
469.)
The reader will have to make up his own mind as to the quality of such further
research; see note 10 supra. He may also ponder the spectacle of one American citing
a second American who refers to a third American's views as to the purpose of a
Canadian statute.
60. 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
61. This capacity was seemingly first restricted by the Senatusconsultum Vellaeanum,
a corrupt version of which appears in DIG. 16, 1,2 (Ulpian). It is commonly dated
46 A.D., but this is controversial. See F. Scnurz, CLAssIcAL ROmAN LAw 569 (1951).
62. Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25
U. Cm. L. Ray. 227 (1958), reprinted in B. CunmE, SELEcra

ESsAYs ON THE CoN

er

oF LAws, ch. 2 (1963).
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one with the protective rule, both states would enforce the contract
because both favor the security of transactions.
However, a companion article employing the same method and
published a few months later, did unearth the category here discussed. The case there analysed is Grant v. McAuliffe,6 3 involving
the issue of survival of actions. Again, assuming the rational basis
of the abatement rule to be that the living should not be mulcted for
the derelictions of the dead, most cases can be classified along the
true- and false-conflicts dichotomy simply by ascertaining whether
the state concerned with the protection of the survivors (typically
the state of administration) is the one that follows the abatement
rule.
In applying this conceptual scheme, however, Professor Currie
came across what he termed "an interesting phenomenon . . . 'the
unprovided case.'" If the plaintiff is domiciled in the abatement
state and the accident occurs there, but the decedent tortfeasor is
domiciled in the non-abatement state and the estate is there administered, "neither state cares what happens." If the action proceeds
to judgment against the decedent's estate, no harm will be done to
his survivors, as these are not within the ambit of the protection of
the abatement rule. If the action is dismissed, no injustice will be
done to the plaintiff, since he could not possibly recover against the
decedent at home.
Why is it apparently impossible to construct a variant of Milliken
v. PrattOthat poses the same problem? The answer seems to be quite
simply that here the policy of upholding agreements entered into in
good faith, common to both states, comes into play whenever other
interests do not. In Grant, on the other hand, there is no such backdrop rule; the "common core" of the law of contracts extends further
than that of the law of torts. To take a more recent example: In
Gravinav. Brunswick Corp.66 the plaintiff, a Rhode Island resident,
sought to recover damages from an Illinois-based corporation, incorporated in Delaware, for invasion of privacy through the unauthorized publication of her picture in bowling equipment advertisements. Invasion of privacy, the Federal District Court in Providence
found, was actionable in Illinois but not in Rhode Island. Its
63. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
64. Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of
Laws, 19 STAN. L. Rrv. 205, 229 (1958). reprinted in B. Cu=mE, supra note 62, ch. 3,
at 152.
65. 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
66. 338 F. Supp. 1 (D.R. 1972).
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Kafkaesque disposition of the case on "better rule of law" grounds
need not concern us here. Obviously, a state court in Rhode Island
would not have done the same thing, i.e., kept a judge-made rule of
domestic law alive for domestic consumption after publicly acknowledging its inferior quality. Assuming, however, that Rhode Island
was unwilling to recognize the new tort, Gravina v. Brunswick
Corp.67 has the makings of a classic "no interest" case. No Rhode
Island interest would be sacrificed by dismissing the action; no
Illinois interest would necessarily be affected by letting it proceed to
judgment for plaintiff.
Or would it? Illinois may well be interested, as my colleague Professor Weintraub suggests in a related context, in keeping up the
quality of Illinois enterprise, and its general reputation, by the ap08
plication of domestic admonitory rules even in cases such as these.
On the other hand, it might hesitate to increase the cost of the
"foreign" operations by Illinois-based companies so as to place them
at a disadvantage elsewhere. 69 As suggested further above, this is not
the sort of inquiry that is appropriate for a Rhode Island court; by
striking the balance in favor of the first consideration, it would be
generous with other people's money. The solution, there as here, is
dismissal at the plaintiff's domicile for forum non conveniens.70
But can it not be said that the "common core" of the law of torts
does reach the instant case, so that in the absence of an articulated
state interest in favor of defendant, the plaintiff should recover?
There is a great deal to be said for that position. The value competing with the right of privacy is the freedom of speech and communication; 71 the value competing with the liability of automobile
drivers for their torts is not their freedom to drive in company in a
carefree manner. The late Mr. Chitty's characteristically sanguine
charge that the legislation proposed in 1934 (and enacted in 1935)
sacrificed the common-law rights of the subject to the demands of
special interests72 has received a good bit of judicial echo in Canada.
67. Id.
68. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICr OF LAws 257-59 (1971). Professor
Weintraub's critique of an earlier draft of the present comment has, as always, been

of substantial assistance.
69. Cf. Howe v. Diversified Builders, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 741, 69 Cal. Rptr. 56

(1968).
70. See text supra at 162-63.
71. See, e.g., Times, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); cf. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
403 U.S. 29 (1971).
72. Chitty, Comment, 3 FORTNHGrTLy L.J. 305, 306 (1934): "highhanded abolition of a
civil right." On the author, see Robert Michael Willes Chitty, Q.C., In Mernoriam, 19
CHrsr's L.J. 37 et seq. (1971).
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In Dokuchia v. Domasch,7 3 McRuer, J. A. (as he then was) said that
the Ontario guest statute "must be strictly construed in that it cuts
down the common law rights of the subject," 74 and this appears to be
the general rule.7 5 In the more recent case of Kearney v. Livesey,76
77
the Court of Appeal was even more specific:

[I]n our view the effect of s. 105(2) of the Highway Traffic
Act, R.S.O. 1960, v. 172, is not to condone a wrongful act by
the driver of a motor vehicle qua driver but simply to bar the
cause of action with respect to that act. The Legislature, in
our view, is quite free to do what it has done in a case such as
this namely, to bar a certain cause of action against a wrongdoer without in any way affecting the legal result of the
wrongful act with respect to someone else liable for that
wrongful act upon some principle of the common law.
This passage was quoted in full, and with approval, by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Cooperators Insurance Ass'n v.
Kearney,78 where the decision of the Court of Appeal in Kearney
was upheld.
Can we say, then, that Neumeier v. Kuehner7 9 is a false-confficts
case because there is a common-core rule of tort liability and the
Ontario exception is, in the light of its purpose, inapplicable? s° So
long as Ontario extends the protection of its guest statute to uninsured Ontario motorists, this is not a proper step for Ontario to
take.8 ' However, New York, called upon to be generous, could
reasonably determine that no competitive domestic interests are disadvantaged by applying the backdrop common law rule to the
Ontario plaintiff's advantage.
Reason and generosity, then, are the ultimate criteria. There is
82
precious little of the latter to be found in Neumeier v. Kuehner;
and the reader will have to determine for himself whether he can
find much of the former.
73. [1945] 1 D.L.R. 757.

74. Id. at 762.
75. See, e.g., Harrison v. Toronto Motor Car Ltd., [1945] 1 D.L.R. 286; ef. Duchaine
v. Armstrong, [1957] O.W.N. 251 (CA.).
76. [1964] 41 D.L.R.2d 196 (1963), aff'd sub nom. Cooperators Insurance Ass'n v.
Kearney, [1965] 48 D.L.R.2d 1 (1964).

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

[1964] 41 D.L.R.2d at 198.
[1965] 48 D.L.R.2d at 33.
31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
This is suggested in a valuable note, 37 ALBANY L. REV. 173, 182-87 (1972).
See text supra at 162-63.
31 N.Y2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
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